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7 



PRKSl-XTl-:j) BY 



The Indian Campaign 

OF 

WINTER OF 1864-65 



WRITTEN IN 1877 

BY 

Major General Grenville M. Dodge 

ANf) 

READ TO THE 
Colorado Commandery 

of the 

Loyal Legion of the United States 

AT DENVER 
APRIL 21, 1907 



Many interesting papers have been read at 
the meetings of the Loyal Legion, but one of 
the most instructive and entertaining was that of 
General Grenville M. Dodge giving his first 
public account of his campaign against the In- 
dians on the plains in 1864-5. 

General Dodge's military experience and 
knowledge of the West peculiarly fitted him for 
this difficult and arduous duty, and his reports 
and the accounts here given show that he most 
successfully accomplished the work and won a 
signal victory over the most vindictive, barbarous 
and treacherous enemies our soldiers have ever 
been called on to fight. 

General Dodge, since the close of the war, 
has been engaged in great railroad and engi- 
neering enterprises, and today stands at the head 
of his profession in this particular work, and is 
a man of national reputation. 

Your committee take great pleasure in hav- 
ing the address printed for the members of our 
Commandery and others interested. 



Gift 



INDIAN CAMPAIGN-J864-65 



In December, 1864, I was assigned to the command of 
the Department of Missouri. In January, 1865, I received 
a dispatch from General Grant asking if a campaign on 
the plains could be made in the Winter. I answered : 
"Yes, if the proper preparation was made to clothe and 
bivouac the troops." A few days after, I received a dis- 
patch from General Grant ordering me to Fort Leaven- 
worth. In the meantime the Department of Kansas was 
merged into the Department of the Missouri, placing under 
my command Missouri, the Indian Territory, Kansas, Colo- 
rado, Utah, Wyoming, and all the country south of the 
Yellowstone river, and embracing all the overland mail 
routes and telegraph lines to the Pacific. 

On reaching Fort Leavenworth I found that General 
Curtis, the former commander of that Department, had re- 
ported against any campaign during the Winter; that the 
Indians had possession of the entire country crossed by the 
stage lines, having destroyed the telegraph lines ; and that 
the people living in Colorado, Western Nebraska and 
Western Kansas were without mails, and in a state of 
panic ; that the troops distributed along the routes of travel 
were inside of their stockades, the Indians having in nearly 
every fight defeated them. This success had brought into 
hostility with the United States nearly every tribe of In- 
dians from Texas on the south to the Yellowstone on the 
north. It was a formidable combination, and the friendly 
Indians were daily leaving the reservations to join their 
hostile brethren. Two thousand Indians had destroyed 
over one hundred miles of telegraph, and were in posses- 
sion of the country between the Arkansas and the North 
Platte rivers. 

The. opinion at Fort Leavenworth before I arrived 
was that it was impossible to make a successful campaign 
against these Indians during the Winter and successfully 



open these lines of communication. There were two reg- 
iments of cavalry in Kansas, mostly idle. There was no 
communication with any of the posts except by messenger. 
A dispatch from Colorado showed a panic there, and the 
people demanded that troops of the Department be sta- 
tioned there to protect the citizens, instead of their organ- 
izing and fighting the Indians, and that martial law had 
been declared. 

I saw, after spending a day at Fort Leavenworth, that 
it was necessary to change the depressed feeling and tem- 
per existing among the troops and the citizens throughout 
the Department. I sent for Bela M. Hughes, agent of the 
overland stages, and Edward Craighten, general manager 
and superintendent of the overland telegraph, and con- 
sulted fully with them. I selected from my old guides some 
of the most trusted men, and some of the trusted Indians 
that I had known, and sent by them to each district com- 
mander who could be reached, these two short dispatches : 

"i. What measures are you taking to keep open the 
route and protect it? What Indians are engaged in the 
struggle? Where are their villages? Do their families 
travel with them? Have you spies in their camps? What 
action have you taken to repair telegraph lines? Give me 
all particulars. 

"2. Place every mounted man in your command on 
the South Platte route. Repair telegraphs, attack any body 
of Indians you meet, large or small. Stay with them and 
pound them until they move north of the Platte or south 
of the Arkansas. I am coming with two regiments of ca- 
valry to the Platte line and will open and protect it, and 
whip all the Indians in the way." 

I also found that the plains were covered with Indian 
traders who had permits, under the guise of which they 
were stealing from the Indians, both friendly and hostile, 
and were selling them arms and ammunition. I immediately 
revoked all these permits, and ordered the arrest of all 
traders who had in their possession Indian or Government 
stock. I also immediately wired to Maj. Frank North, who 

4 



was the interpreter of the Pawnee Indians, and also to the 
Chief of the Omaha Indians, both of whom had been with 
me on the plains, and instructed them to select their most 
trusted men and send them on the plains to ascertain for 
me the purpose of the hostile Indians, and whether they 
would head towards the settlements, or if their movements 
indicated they would attack only the lines of communica- 
tion and the trains crossing the plains. At the same time 
we stopped all trains on the plains and ordered them to the 
nearest military post, instructing the officers to arm and 
organize them in companies, and place a United States offi- 
cer over them, and have them move with the army trains. 

Having perfected the preliminary organization for 
moving upon the stage and telegraph lines, we saw it was 
necessary to concentrate on one line. At this time the stage 
and telegraph lines on the north ran from Fort Leaven- 
worth to Fort Kearney, and from Omaha to Fort Kearney, 
where they were consolidated, running up the Platte val- 
ley to the mouth of the Lodgepole, the stage station at that 
point being known as Julesburg. The lines here separatee 1 
again, the main telegraph line running to old Fort Lara- 
mie, thence up the Sweetwater through South Pass and 
thence to Utah. The stage line ran up the South Platte 
to Denver, then by the Cache La Poudre to Laramie 
Plains, over them to Fort Hallack and Bridger and on to 
Utah. I concluded to concentrate all our efforts to open 
the line from Fort Leavenworth and Omaha to Kearney, 
thence to Denver and on to Utah, known as the South 
Platte Route. 

The overland route from Fort Leavenworth and 
Omaha crossing the continent had a stage station about 
every twelve miles. The troops along the lines were posted 
at the forts and stockades about every hundred miles, with 
a few soldiers distributed at each stage station. Then 
scattered along the road were ranches, relay and feeding 
stations for the regular commercial and supply trains that 
were continually on the road. The great mining camps, 
and all the inhabitants of Colorado, Utah, Wyoming and 

5 



Idaho were dependent upon these trains for their supplies. 
In winter these trains were generally mule trains of twenty 
wagons each, and during the summer were generally ox 
trains of fifty to one hundred wagons each. They were in 
the habit of straggling along through the country,' taking 
care of themselves. Their stock had to be herded at night, 
and it was a great temptation to the Indians to steal, and 
a great deal of this had been done, but no actual fighting 
or attacking of trains or troops occurred until the winter 
of '64 and '65. The stopping of these trains, mail and 
supplies, and the destruction of the telegraph wires, caused 
great consternation in that country and on the Pacific 
Coast, and the demands upon the government to open and 
maintain these lines were persistent. 

At Fort Leavenworth there appeared to have been no 
systematic effort to reopen these lines. It seemed that the 
troops were taking care of the posts and resisting attacks. 
They did not seem to appreciate the Indian character; that 
the only way to strengthen and protect the lines of com- 
munication was to go for the Indians. What troops had 
been sent against the Indians were small and weak parties, 
and had evidently gone out with the intention of locating 
the Indians and avoiding them. 

Along the south emigrant line from Kansas City, fol- 
lowing the Arkansas river to New Mexico, was the line of 
supplies for all of New Mexico and Southern Colorado. 
The Indians here were in possession. The travel and traf- 
fic along it were not to be compared with that ajong the 
northern lines. Then again the citizens of Kansas and Ne- 
braska had settled along these routes as far west as the 
100th Meridian, obtaining their living from this great traf- 
fic, and the Indians in their raids had picked them up, fam- 
ily at a time, until they had a great many prisoners, mostly 
women and children, the men being generally massacred 
when captured. 

I found the nth Kansas Cavalry at Fort Riley, and the 
1 6th Kansas Cavalry at Fort Leavenworth, and immedia- 
tely placed them en route for Fort Kearney. All the posts 

6 



were, unfortunately, short of subsistence, forage and am- 
munition. The three months' regiments enlisted in Colo- 
rado for the Indian service had been discharged, their time 
having expired, and there had been no troops sent to take 
their place. My only resource was to utilize the Colorado 
militia until I could send troops six hundred miles to take 
their places. 

I immediately started for Fort Kearney, taking with 
me a few soldiers in the stage and one of my staff. It was 
the opinion of all the officers at Fort Leavenworth that it 
would be impossible for me to make the trip, but I knew 
it required personal presence among the troops to bring 
about quick results. The troops that I had ordered to 
march from Fort Riley refused to inarch in the winter. I 
answered to place under arrest all officers of the companies 
and regiments that refused to obey the order, and have 
them report to Fort Leavenworth, intending to replace 
them with veteran officers of the Department whom I 
knew would move, no matter what the hardship. The next 
morning I received a report from Fort Riley that the troops 
would move. The regiment that marched from Fort Riley 
to Fort Kearney lost thirteen men from freezing, as the 
weather was very severe, and while they were properlv 
clothed, they did not know how to protect themselves from 
the weather. 

On my arrival at Fort Kearney I immediately ' notified 
Mr. Hughes, agent of the stage lines, that I was prepared 
to protect his stages, and called upon him to replace his stock 
immediately, ready to start out his stages. I also notified 
Mr. Craighten, superintendent of the telegraph lines, to re- 
place his operators, for I would have his lines open in a 
few days. Both of these orders were made known to the 
public. I also notified the "press" at Omaha and Fort 
Leavenworth that all trains which were tied up on the 
plains would be moved to their destinations during that 
month. We found it necessary to inspire energy and confi- 
dence in these three great interests, as not one of them 
even thought we would succeed, and in fact the "press" 

7 



comments on our orders showed that they had no faith in 
them. I found on the line of the Platte the 7th Iowa Ca- 
valry, and at Fort Laramie and on the Sweetwater the nth 
Ohio Cavalry. 

When we arrived in sight of Fort Kearney the troops 
were prepared to fight us, thinking it was a band of In- 
dians. We discovered that the troops were depressed from 
the success of the Indians and the murder and mutiliation 
of their comrades, and that they hardly stuck their heads 
out of the stockade. Having had experience with Indians, I 
called the troops together and instructed them how to han- 
dle and to fight Indians, telling them that an aggressive 
war would be made against the Indians, and no matter how 
large the Indian bands were, or how small the troop, that 
hereafter they must stand and fight ; that if they did the 
Indians would run. If they did not, the Indians would 
catch and scalp them, and even if they had to retreat, they 
must do so with their faces to the enemy. v 

The Indians, after the Chivington fight on Big Sandy, 
had concentrated upon the South Platte and on the Sweet- 
water. The reports showed that they held possession from 
Julesburg to Valley Junction and to Mud Springs, and held 
the telegraph line west of Fort Laramie. They had with 
them two thousand head of captured stock and had cap- 
tured all the stage stations, many trains, devastated the 
ranches, butchered many men, women and children, and 
destroyed one hundred miles of telegraph. 

To show more plainly than I can describe the con- 
dition of the country, I give the reports of the three com- 
manding officers along the South Platte route, in answer 
to the dispatches which I sent by messenger to all com- 
manders the day I arrived at Fort Leavenworth. These 
answers met me at Fort Kearney. 

Gen. Robt. Mitchell, who commanded the territory 
from Omaha to Lodgepole, replied as follows : 

'The telegraph from Lodgepole creek, 25 miles west 
to Julesburg, on Laramie route, is destroyed for 15 miles. 
Poles cut down and destroyed on the Denver line beyond 



Julesburg for the first 50 miles. The telegraph is destroyed 
about 10 miles north. We are compelled to haul poles 
from 130 to 140 miles. Every means in my power is used 
to have the lines fixed. All the available troops I have at 
my disposal are in the vicinity of Julesburg", except some 
small garrisons at posts required to be kept up on the Den- 
ver route. My district only extends to Julesburg. I have 
sent some troops, however, up that route 50 miles since 
the outbreaks and find everything destroyed. We have 
no communication with Denver, and have not had since 
the last outbreak. Neither can I communicate with Fort 
Laramie in consequence of the lines being down. I have 
been traversing the country constantly on and adjacent to 
the mail and telegraph lines during the past four months, 
sending guards on the stage and, when deemed necessary, 
mounted guards and patrols on all dangerous portions of 
the road through my district. 

"This plan succeeded until an overpowering force at- 
tacked Julesburg and drove the troops inside of their 
works and burnt the stage and telegraph station, destroy- 
ing a large amount of stores for both companies. The 
overland stage cannot run through until they can provide 
for supplies for stock from Julesburg to the Junction, 
where overland stage leaves Denver route, everything be- 
longing to the stage company, citizens and government be- 
ing entirely destroyed. The Indian villages are unknown 
to us. From the best information I have I believe them to 
be on the Powder river. I know certainly there is a large 
village there. There have been no squaws in the country^ 
to my knowledge, since last fall. The tribes engaged are 
the Cheyennes, Arapahoes, Kiowas, Brule, Ogallala Sioux, 
a portion of the Blackfeet, and a large portion of what is 
known as the Missouri River Sioux, the same Indians Gen- 
eral Sully made the campaign against last summer. From 
3,000 to 5,000 additional trops will be needed to punish 
the Indians. One column will never be able to overtake 
them, unless they are willing to give battle. I think three 
columns of men 1,000 strong, each with ample garrison 



9 



on the overland mail and telegraph lines, well mounted and 
supplied, can clear out the country of all hostile Indians, if 
done before grass comes. After that time, in my judg- 
ment, it will take twice that number of men. 

"In addition to the troubles west, I would not be 
surprised any day to hear of an outbreak in the northern 
part of my district. I am informed by Indian scouts that 
there is a large encampment of Indians on the Running 
Water that are ready to engage in the war against the 
whites. Among them are some of the Yanktonis Sioux." 

Col. R. R. Livingston reported as follows : "In reply 
to your inquiries I would respectfully state that in the 
early part of January last indications of large parties of 
Indians moving westward on Republican were reported by 
the scouts sent to gain information of their movements. 
On January 7th they had crossed South Fork Platte river, 
23 miles west of this post, camped with their families, 
forming a camp of 400 lodges, containing eight warriors 
each, many lodges being thirty robes in size. They com- 
menced the work of destruction along the road west as far 
as Junction Station, 100 miles from here. Their forces in 
this fight were not less than 2,000, well armed with breech- 
loading carbines and rifles. A desperate attempt on their 
part to burn the overland stage station near this post was 
made at this time, but was frustrated by the gallantry of 
Captain N. J. O'Brien, Company F, 7th Iowa Cavalry. 
Every ranch and stage station from Junction station to this 
post is burned, and the charred remains of every inmate 
who failed to escape tell of the brutality they were sub- 
jected to. I telegraphed Hon. Sam H. Elbert, acting gov- 
ernor of Colorado, early in January of the state of things. 
The troops of Colorado have been withdrawn from Val- 
ley, 50 miles west of here, I surmise, to concentrate around 
Denver. The telegraph lines to Salt Lake, and the Denver 
branch lines are destroyed for a distance of nearly ten 
miles on the northern route, and in different • points 
throughout one hundred miles along the Denver. 

"I have but 360 troops, but so long as human endur- 

10 



ance holds out we will work night and day to get the com- 
munication perfect with the west. 

"The Indians engaged in this war are the Cheyenne, 
Ogallalas, Brule and Sioux. They have gone northward to- 
wards Horse creek and Fort Laramie. Their trail leads in 
that direction, but they are slow in marching, feeling au- 
dacious and indifferent to any effort from the small body 
of troops in this district. I saw their signals today, prob- 
ably those of small war parties, on the North Platte. You 
will hear of continued murders and robberies as long as 
the road is so poorly protected by troops. No spies can be 
used now, owing to numerous small war parties being met 
everywhere in this country. I predict that if more troops 
are not sent into this district immediately, this road will be 
stripped of every ranch and white man on it. Should 
these Indians swing around by Lea Oui Court river and 
strike the Omaha road below Kearney, where settlements 
are numerous, infinite mischief will result to the settlers. 
What we need are troops, supplies for them, and a vigor- 
ous campaign against these hostile Indians. They must 
be put on the defensive instead of us. No difficulty can 
arise in rinding them. Over 2,000 cattle accompany 
them." 

"HEADQUARTERS, DISTRICT COLORADO, 

"Denver, Colo. Territory, Feb. 2, 1865. 

"The Indians are bold in the extreme. They have 
burned every ranch between Julesburg and Valley Station, 
and nearly all the property at latter place ; driven off all 
stock, both public and private. These Indians are led by 
white men, and have complete control of all the country 
outside my district, so that I am hemmed in. 

"The weather has been very severe here for nearly 
three weeks ; the thermometer 30 degrees below zero, 
with quite a fall of snow on the ground. I have tried 
every means in my power to raise volunteers for three 
months' state service, but as yet have not succeeded, ow- 
ing to the factional spirit existing in the community. 

11 



"The Legislature took the matter in hand at my sug- 
gestion, appropriating so much money, Territorial bonds, 
to give the men a bounty and purchase horses to mount 
them on, as I have none, but the members cannot agree 
on the spoil, likely in their estimation to accrue from such 
a proceeding, so the bill has not yet passed. I addressed 
the speaker of the house yesterday, informing him 
that unless something was done within forty-eight 
hours I would be compelled, much against my will, to pro- 
claim martial law and stop all business, forcing every man 
to enter the ranks and open the line of communication. I 
have now a city organization of about 100 men organized 
into companies, so that in case of an attack here I would 
have something tangible to lay hold of and make a fight. 
I have had a great deal of trouble in this matter, as there 
is no concert of action, every man suspecting his fellow of 
some chicanery. 

"Fort Lyon is being rapidly fortified, so that 200 men 
can defend it against 2,000 Indians. Militia companies are 
being organized all over the settled parts of the country 
(under penalty of being pressed into service) to defend 
the frontier settlements southward, and could I but get a 
regiment here now I could keep things in a running trim 
until the arrival of sufficient force to make a campaign. 
The Indians are now determined to make it a war of ex- 
termination and nothing short of 5,000 men can make it 
extermination for them. 

"Major Wynkoop informed me from Fort Lyon that . 
many warriors were on the headwaters of the Smoky Hill 
and intended attacking all the settlements as well as Den- 
ver. Provisions, owing to the transportation line being 
cut off", are at an exorbitant price, as well as labor and 
forage. 

"Cannot troops be sent out here immediately, or au- 
thority to raise companies, which could.be easily done, for 
one year? 

"The Santa Fe line has threatened to stop running 
on account of the Indians. Should such be the case, then 
all is cut off. Respectfully your obdient servant, 
"THOMAS MOONLIGHT, 
"Col. nth Kansas Cavalry, "Commanding." 

12 



Col. Chivington, from Fort Rankin, reported : "Lieut. 
Col. Collins with 200 men of the nth Ohio, and Company 
D, 7th Iowa Cavalry, fought Indians from the 4th to the 
9th inst., at Mud Springs. The Indians at one time 
charged our forces in the face of artillery and were nearly 
successful. Two thousand warriors were engaged in the 
fight. It is supposed forty Indians were killed. Beaure's 
and Craighton's herds were driven off. The Indians 
crossed at Bush creek, going north. The telegraph poles 
were gone and wires so inextricably tangled as to be^ use- 
less. Seven hundred lodges crosssed Pole creek, six miles 
below Pole creek crossing." 

These Indians were not driven off and the telegraph 
lines retaken without severe fighting and loss of many 
soldiers. Within two weeks the troops drove these In- 
dians north, where a detachment of troops from Fort Lar- 
amie attacked them and drove them across the Platte. 
Finally^ the Indians saw that a different warfare was being 
made against hem, and they fled to their villages on the 
Powder river and in the Black Hills country. 

There was such energy and such spirit displayed by 
the troops, that after two weeks' work they had the tele- 
graph lines replaced between Omaha and Denver, a dis- 
tance of 600 miles, and this without any additional force to 
aid them. The progress made in putting up the wires is 
shown by this report : 

"My troop is at Moore's ranch, passed there at two 
o'clock. We ran twelve miles of wire and set eight miles 
of poles, had two severe fights, and marched 55 miles in 
52 hours. Operators furnished valuable service. 

"E. B. Murphy, Capt. 7th Iowa Cavalry." 

The thermometers all this time were from five to ten 
degrees below zero. On February 13th telegraphic com- 
munication was resumed through to California, and Mr. 
Craighten notified the government of the fact. 

An inquiry made of Craighten by General Grant, as 
to where I was located (Craighten, being a personal friend 
of mine, who was most skeptical at the start of my ac- 

13 



complishing anything with the material I had, was over- 
joyed at our success), was answered: "Nobody knows 
where he is, but everybody knows where he has been." 

From the 5th to the 13th of February every mounted 
man on that line was in the saddle, either assisting the op- 
erators or chasing real or imaginary Indians. The moment 
a scout came in, instructions were given to the officers to 
send them out and not allow any mounted troops in the 
stockade until the lines were opened and the Indians driven 
at least 100 miles away from the line of telegraph, and the 
only dashes the Indians made after we got fairly at them 
was to cut off a part of an unguarded train, and at un- 
guarded ranches, and at those stage stations where only a 
few soldiers were located, but in every attack the soldiers 
stood their ground and fought, and when driven they only 
backed far enough to get a secure place. The troops knew 
better than to go back to the fortified posts, as they had 
instructions to keep to the hills, but in nearly every case 
they were successful, and the daring that some of the 
troops showed in these fights was remarkable. 

Great atrocities were committed by the Indians, scalp- 
ing the men alive and abusing the women. This caused 
the troops to stand and fight, preferring to die rather than 
to fall into their hands. Wherever a fight was success- 
fully made, no matter whether commissioned or non-com- 
missioned officers commanded, I telegraphed him in person 
thanking him, and to the commanding officer of his reg- 
iment, requesting that he be given the first promotion, and 
wrote to the governor of his State. 

As soon as this stage line was opened we concentrated 
about five hundred mounted men, intending to catch the 
Indians before they left the North Platte, but the Indians 
fled as soon as they heard of this, and did not stop until 
they reached Powder river, too far north for us to follow 
until arrangements were made for supplies for troops and 
stock, as everything had to be teamed from Fort Leaven- 
worth. 

The storms during March were very severe. Snow 



lav two feet on the level and was crusted so hard that for 
weeks it was almost impossible to force animals through 
it. As soon as we heard from my scouts of the departure 
of the Indians and found they had no intention of molest- 
ing the citizens of Nebraska, and had placed themselves 
on Powder river too far north to return until the return of 
the grass in May, I distributed the troops along the stage 
and telegraph lines to Salt Lake, and returned to open the 
South route to New Mexico. 

My experience on the North route, with the reports 
from the troops and from my Indians, soon satisfied me 
that every Indian tribe of any importance, from the Brit- 
ish possessions in the north to the Red river in the south, 
were preparing to engage in open hostilities. These tribes 
often pretended to be friendly, deceiving the government 
and the Indian agent, a crafty trick that was impossible to 
make the government understand. For instance, they 
would go to the Indian agent for provisions, and would 
make him believe that they were for peace, and would 
promise to bring to the agency their tribe. Probably by 
the time the report of the Indian agent reached the govern- 
ment, this same tribe would be off on the warpath and have 
captured a train or murdered some settlers, and the troops 
in return had attacked and destroyed them, and we were 
called to account for it, as it was claimed by the agents 
we were attacking peaceable Indians. This went so far 
that it prevented me from opening the southern emigrant 
trail several weeks. Finally I took the matter in my own 
hands, regardless of the action or report of the agents. 

While these parleys were going on the Indians sud- 
denly appeared all along the southern emigrant trail in the 
Arkansas river valley, attacking trains, posts and escorts. 
I threw my troops against the bands of Southern Arapa- 
hoes, Cheyennes, Comanches and Kiowas that were in 
the vicinity of the trail. The troops had caught on to the 
severe fighting on the Platte, had heard of the new methods 
of warfare and victories, and they in all cases stood their 
ground and defeated the Indians, although they suffered 

15 



severely in some instances. This was a reception that the 
Indians did not expect and they fled to the Wichita moun- 
tains, suing for peace, which I knew was simply to prevent 
us attacking them there, but accomplished its purpose with 
the government and finally brought about the treaties that 
were not worth the paper they were written on, and later 
on forced the campaigns that Sheridan afterwards made, 
while if we had been allowed to have followed them up and 
punish them as we did the northern tribes, we would have 
conquered a peace that would have been a lasting one. 

The Indians of the plains are the best skirmishers in 
the world. In rapidity of movements, in perfect horse- 
manship, sudden whirling, protecting the body by cling- 
ing to the side of the horse, and rapid movements in open 
and difficult ground, no trained cavalry in the world can 
equal them. On foot their ability to hide behind any ob- 
struction, in ravine, along creeks and under creek and 
river banks, and in fighting in the open plains or level 
ground, the faculty to disappear is beyond one's belief 
except he has experienced it. In skulking and snapshoot- 
ing they are adepts, but troops properly instructed are a 
match for them on foot and never fail to drive and rout 
them, if they will stand and fight and never retreat except 
slowly with their faces to them. I have seen several times, 
when caught in a tight place, bands of Indians held by a 
few men by holding to ridges and slowly retreating, always 
using our rifles at every opportunity when an Indian was 
in range, never wasting a shot on them unless there was 
a probability of hitting them. The Indians have a mortal 
fear of such tactics. 

In a fight the Indians will select the positions and pick 
out quickly any vantage ground, and some times as high 
as 200 will concentrate at such a point where we could not 
concentrate 20 men without exposing them, and from this 
vantage ground they will pour a deadly fire on the troops, 
and we cannot see an Indian, only puffs of smoke. By such 
tactics as this they harass and defeat our troops. Many a 
fight occurred between Indians and soldiers both watch- 

16 



ing the smoke to show each other's position. You can 
watch this kind of a fight and never see a person unless 
some one is hit and exposes himself, when it is nearly al- 
ways a sure death. The Indian character is such that he 
will not stand continual following-, pounding and attack- 
ing. Their life and methods are not accustomed to it, and 
the Indians can be driven by very inferior forces by con- 
tinually watching, attacking and following. None of our 
campaigns have been successful that have not been pre- 
pared to follow the Indians day and night, attacking them 
at every opportunity until they are worn out, disbanded or 
forced to surrender, which is the sure result of such a 
campaign. 

The Indians during the months they had been hostile, 
and especially in their attacks on the stage stations and 
ranches, had captured a large number of men, women and 
children. These prisoners had made known to the troops, 
by dropping notes along the trail and through the reports 
of friendly Indians, their terrible condition and the usage 
that was being made of them*. Their appeals to us to res- 
cue them were pitiful. 

I knew the prisoners would be sent far north to the 
villages, and their winter quarters out of our reach ; that 
these villages were unprotected because every brave and 
dog-soldier had his warpaint on and was joining the hos- 
tile forces attacking along our lines, which were increasing 
every day. I also knew it would be impossible for any of 
our troops to reach them or to rescue them by following 
them, and as soon as I arrived at Fort Kearney I asked 
authority of the government to enlist and muster into ser- 
vice two companies of Pawnee Indians, to be under the 
command of their old interpreter, Major North, who I 
knew to be a brave, level-headed leader. This authority 
was immediately given me, and Major North was given 
confidential instructions to proceed to the Sioux country, 
apparently on scout duty, but to watch his opportunity and 
rescue these prisoners, while their braves were down fight- 
ing us. He started, but storms of snow came down so 

17 



heavy that his ponies could get nothing to eat, and during 
the latter part of February and all of March these storms 
were continuous, the snow falling to the depth of two feet 
over the entire plains. Major North was compelled to seek 
shelter in the river bottoms, and browsed his stock on Cot- 
tonwood limbs to save them. In the campaign of the sum- 
mer and winter of 1865 an< ^ x 866 Major North, with his 
two enlisted companies, to which I added two more, made 
some wonderful marches, scouts, battles and captures, and 
during- that campaign we recaptured and had surrendered 
to us many of these women and children prisoners. 

After the war Major North became manager of the 
Indians in Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, and died in that 
service. He was a noted man on the plains. My acquain- 
tance with him commenced in 1856, and together we had 
seen and endured many hardships. It was seldom one 
met his equal in any of the different phases of plains life. 
Although he had led an eventful career, still I never heard 
him refer to what he had done or accomplished, or the 
part he had taken in battles, and probably no man was ever 
more worshipped than he was by the two tribes of Pawnee 
Indians, and his death was virtually their destruction, for 
during his life among them he held them under good dis- 
cipline and kept them away from vice, disease and war. 

A great many amusing reports came to me from my 
scouts and the captured Indians. When on the plains in 
the 50's I was known among the Indians by the name, 
in their language, that signified "Long Eye," "Sharp 
Eye" and "Hawk Eye." This came from the fact that 
when I first went among them it was as an engineer mak- 
ing surveys through their country. With my engineering 
instruments I could set a head flag two or three miles 
away, even further than an Indian could see, and it is 
their custom to give a practical name to everything. Of 
course I was not many days on the plains until it reached 
the Indians that "Long Eye" was there, and in every fight 
that occurred they had me present. They said I could 
shoot as far as I could see. The scouts said the Indian 

18 



chiefs laid their defeats to that fact. Then again they were 
very superstitious about my power in other matters. When 
the overland telegraph was built they were taught to respect 
it and not destroy it. They were made to believe that it 
was a great Medicine. This was done after the line was 
opened to Fort Laramie by stationing several of their most 
intelligent chiefs at Fort Laramie and others at Fort Kear- 
ney, the two posts being three hundred miles apart, and 
then having them talk to each other over the wire and note 
the time sent and received. Then we had them mount their 
fleetest horses and ride as fast as they could until they met 
at Old Jules' ranch, at the mouth of the Lodgepole, this 
being about half way between Kearney and Laramie. Of 
course this was astonishing and mysterious to the Indians. 
Thereafter you could often see Indians with their heads 
against the telegraph poles, listening to the peculiar sound 
the wind makes as it runs along the wires and through the 
insulators. It is a soughing, singing sound. They thought 
and said it was "Big Medicine" talking. I never could con- 
vince them that I could not go to the telegraph poles the 
same as they did and tell them what was said, or send a 
message for them to some chief far away, as they had often 
seen me use my traveling instrument and cut into the line, 
sending and receiving messages. Then again, most of the 
noted scouts of the plains who had married into the different 
tribes had been guides for me, and many of these men were 
half-breeds, and were with these hostile Indians. Some 
of them took part with them, but more of them had tried 
to pacify and bring them to terms, and they gave me in- 
formation about those who were not engaged in the depre- 
dations. 

I was supposed to be, by the Indians of the plains, a 
person of great power and great moment. These half- 
breeds worked upon their superstitions, endeavoring to con- 
vince them it was useless to fight "Long Eye." No doubt 
my appearing on the plains the time I did, and the fact 
that from the time I appeared until the time I left, the 
troops had nothing but success, carried great weight with 

19 



them, and seemed to confirm what the old voyageurs and 
guides told them, and had much influence in causing their 
abandonment of the Platte country and returning to their 
villages. 

My own experience on the plains led me to be just as 
watchful and just as vigilant when I knew the Indians 
were not near me as I was when they were in sight. In all 
my travels I never allowed them to camp near or occupy 
my camps, even in the time of peace, when we were friend- 
ly, and I never allowed myself to knowingly do them an in- 
justice, and made it a point never to lie to them in any of 
my councils and treaties, or never allow, if I knew it, the 
interpreter to deceive them. That brought me respect in 
all my dealings with them, and I treated them with respect, 
courtesy and consideration, and demanded the same from 
them. This, no doubt, was one of the principal reasons that 
in fifteen years, more or less, intercourse with them, trav- 
eling through their country both during the times they 
were hostile and at peace, that I escaped many of the mis- 
fortunes that befell others. 

Although this short campaign was not remarkable for 
great battles or large loss by killed and wounded, still it 
required great fortitude from the troops, and often great 
personal courage, and its success was of great moment to 
the government and to the people of the plains and the 
Pacific coast, for over these three great overland routes 
were carried the mails, telegrams, and traffic during the 
entire war of the Rebellion, which did much to hold these 
people loyal to our government. A long stoppage was a 
destruction to business, and would bring starvation and 
untold misery ; and when, with only thirteen days and 
nights of untiring energy on the part of the troops in a 
winter of unheard-of severity, California, Utah and Colo- 
rado were put in communication with the rest of the world, 
there was great rejoicing. In seventeen days the stages 
were started and overland travel was again safe, after be- 
ing interrupted for two months, and by March 1st the 
commercial trains were all en route to their destinations and 



20 



I had returned to my duties at the headquarters of the De- 
partment in St. Louis. 

It was with no little satisfaction that I answered a 
personal letter General Grant had written me, when he as- 
signed me to, this duty, and which I found awaiting me at 
Fort Leavenworth. In his letter he outlined what it was 
necessary to do and why he had asked me to take the field. 
He judged rightly of the condition of affairs and the ne- 
cessity of immediate action. I wrote him how promptly 
the troops responded to my call. They had opened the 
overland routes ; they had made them secure and were then 
guarding them, and they would be kept open. But after 
grass came, unless these hostile Indians were thoroughly 
chastised, they would certainly and successfully attack them 
and prevent safe travel overland, and from my letter the 
order soon came for me to prepare for the extensive cam- 
paign of the next summer and winter .that followed these 
Indians to the Yellowstone on the north and the Cimar- 
ron on the south, and conquered a peace with every hostile 
tribe. 



